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The catastrophe of Chernobyl 
twenty years later
JEAN-PIERRE DUPUY
If we wish to prevent greater climate catastrophe, it is imperative that we prevent ourselves from extracting the more than one third of the fossil fuels, oil, gas and coal that still remain buried underground. Surely, the 
energy market will never be able of such an effort of self-constraint. Markets 
exist only to manage scarce resources. It turns out that fossil fuels, far from 
being scarce, are strongly overabundant if we take account of the climate 
change threat. I insist: we have three times more fossil resources than we have 
the right to use – otherwise, the climate apocalypse will be our fate.
The world nuclear lobby is aware of this and, both publicly and in 
secret, it strives to draw attention to the environmental threat because, as it 
sees it, therein lies the best chances for civil nuclear energy. But I ask, is this 
really the only choice left for us, between poisoning the Planet or some kind 
of technical dictatorship? So I would like to pose a background question: 
are the conditions required to make nuclear energy safe compatible with the 
ground rules of an open and fair democratic society? The management of the 
catastrophe at Chernobyl leads us do doubt this.
Assessment or deceit?
If we were to ascertain that opacity, dissimulation and mendacity are 
necessary conditions to assure an “image of safety”, then the energy equation 
would remain unresolved.
What is most terrifying in the case of Chernobyl is that the experts’ 
presumed competence is a far cry from the quality of thought worthy of 
the great problems it poses to society. Technocracy, never shy of accusing its 
opponents of irrationality and obscurantism, lacks the seriousness and that 
minimum discernment we have the right to expect from citizens who put in 
jeopardy the very possibility of a safe and worthy life on this Planet. Technical 
competence that does not “think” – to use Heidegger’s phrase – that is the 
supreme danger.
To assess the effects of a nuclear catastrophe on human health, three 
methods can be used:
Direct observation.
Epidemiological research.
Modeling. 
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Relief workers during the ﬁrst hours after the catastrophe at Chernobyl 
– the so-called "liquidators" - received such high doses of radiation that, in 
all certainty, their death can be attributed to the accident. However, for the 
people who, immediately or afterwards, were submitted to lower dosages, 
things are more complicated.
In principle, epidemiological research can assess, retrospectively, 
how much above the expected rate the affected populations succumbed 
to malignant diseases. But this type of study could not be carried out 
appropriately in Chernobyl because the affected populations, the ﬁreﬁghters 
and the displaced inhabitants were dispersed throughout the entire territory of 
the Soviet Union and no follow-up was possible.
In lieu of epidemiological research, we had had to resort to modeling, 
the same modeling that must be used to estimate future deaths.
International radioprotection authorities used a linear model with no 
threshold. This means the model assumes that the effect on morbidity and 
mortality is proportional to the received dosage of radiation, even for very low 
doses. In other words, there is no radiation threshold below which the effect is 
deemed null.
If we read the report of the Chernobyl Forum with attention, we ﬁnd 
that the 4,000 reported deaths were reckoned by applying the non-threshold 
linear model to a very limited portion of the world population affected by the 
radiation: approximately 600,000 people – 200,000 “liquidators”, 120,000 
people who were removed from the site and another 270,000 residents of 
the most contaminated areas. As for the millions of other human beings also 
affected, the ofﬁcial estimate remains silent, which led the world to think that 
the catastrophe was not responsible for any of their deaths. This, however, is a 
travesty of the model method.
I was in Kiev and visited the site at Chernobyl, where it was mentioned 
that the removal of the 48,000 inhabitants of Pripyat, a neighboring city, only 
began 36 hours after the explosion. Among those displaced, 15,000 seem to 
have died in the six following months, heaped in the hospitals of Kiev. We were 
insistently reminded of the tragedy involving the 600 to 800,000 liquidators, 
the often-compelled volunteers who cleaned the site and absorbed the highest 
doses of radiation, and of which we know practically nothing about. 
The Chernobyl catastrophe produced considerable radioactivity; 
actually, hundreds of times more radioactive material than in Hiroshima was 
released. Doctors and geneticists spoke to us at length about the effects of low 
doses of radioactivity on the dozens of millions of people who live, drink, eat 
and reproduce in a contaminated milieu: cancerous tumors, cardiopathies, 
chronic fatigue, unheard-of ailments and a feeling of helplessness affect a huge 
population, particularly the children and the youth. Not to mention the feared 
irreversible effects on the human genome.
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Ofﬁcial reports, however, continue to mention “only” 4,000 people 
affected by “direct exposure to radiations”, as if the accident had not impaired 
the lives of millions of unfortunate people who will transmit their misfortune 
to their offspring generation after generation.
* * *
On August 2005, as the 20th anniversary of the nuclear catastrophe 
at Chernobyl, which occurred on April 26, 1986, drew nearer, I participated 
in a summer course, in Ukraine, dedicated to analyzing the consequences of 
the disaster.
One of the goals of the meeting was to organize a large traveling 
exhibition on the catastrophe, which was inaugurated last May at the Center of 
Contemporary Culture in Barcelona. (After Spain, the exhibit should come to 
São Paulo.) We spent one week in Kiev, after one day in the contaminated zone 
and some hours in the vicinity of the reactor that exploded – now covered by a 
steel and cement structure nicknamed “sarcophagus”.
Back in Paris, I was disconcerted by the contrast between what I saw 
and felt there and what I read in the ofﬁcial UN report as the “deﬁnitive” 
account of the catastrophe. We were told of hundreds of thousands of deaths, 
but the ofﬁcial assessment acknowledged only 37 deaths until then and, 
perhaps, 4,000 when all was over. I decided to publish a book Retour de 
Tchernobyl: Journal d’un homme en colère [Back from Chernobyl: Diary of an 
enraged man].
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On display at the Kiev Museum, in Ukraine, photographs of children who died in Chernobyl.
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The conclusion I reached on these reﬂections is that the international 
nuclear lobby, headed by the International Atomic Energy Commission, 
is willing to perpetrate the most scandalous dissimulations in order not to 
discredit civil nuclear energy. I do not believe people are dishonest. Why, then, 
do they act in this manner? Because they are afraid to unleash wholesale panic. 
They are much more afraid of the fear of the people than they are afraid of 
their machines. And that is what is most worrisome. Because fear can be a 
good adviser. Today we can say that Chernobyl has not served as a lesson at 
all. The World Association of Nuclear Operators, created after the catastrophe 
with the explicit intent of preventing its repetition, acknowledged recently 
that that, in average, the safety of the world’s nuclear plants is disastrous and 
that a new Chernobyl would be enough for the organization to fall apart. The 
lessons of Chernobyl were swept under the rug with a misleading refrain: “It 
was a Soviet, not a nuclear accident”.
For you to grasp the horror of the catastrophe, I will present two series 
of slides. The ﬁrst contains pictures I took during our stay at Kiev and our visit 
to Chernobyl; the second has photos taken by the Ukrainian photographer 
Igor Kostine during the hours, days and years after the catastrophe. You will 
see the reactor that exploded, the work of the “liquidators” – the 800,000 
ﬁreﬁghters, soldiers and volunteers who risked their lives to extinguish the ﬁre 
in the reactor, remove the nuclear waste and build the sarcophagus. You will 
also see the city of Pripyat, where the plant’s workers and their families lived: 
50,000 people in all who were evacuated 36 hours after the explosion. The 
city is still there, almost intact, but deprived of life for the next 20,000 years. 
You will also see the legal procedures against those who were held responsible. 
The most difﬁcult photos to endure are those of the baby monsters who were 
born from mothers who had the infelicity of being pregnant in Pripyat on that 
fateful April 26, 1986.
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One of the consequences of Chernobyl was a progressive increase in diseases, particularly 
in children, including fetuses in utero at the time of the accident, in 1986.
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The explosion in the reactor occurred at 1:23 am, April 26, 1986, and hit…
…a children’s school in the Pripyat region: shattered glass and material strewn on the ﬂoor.
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Children’s beds and toys in a nursery, burnt from the violence of the explosion.
Children’s photo albums and a gas mask are living memories of the tragedy.
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Horror scene: the doll and the gas mask covered with dust in the Pripyat school.
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The shock wave from the nuclear explosion destroyed a playground in Pripyat.
Dense mortar powder and bricks reduced to dust cover children’s shoes in the school.
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Survivors of the Chernobyl radiation became susceptible to cancer.
Belarus Vladislav Petrov, not yet 4, contracted cancer caused by the radiation.
